of Belief is an important contribution to the study of epistemology, and social epistemology in particular. It is also a very timely contribution. For too long, epistemologists and social epistemologists have talked about authority in the domain of belief without paying enough attention to the very concept of epistemic authority.
philosophical community the two central concepts, of epistemic authority and of preemptive reasons for belief, and the relation between them.
With some qualifications, I think that Zagzebski's central claims about the conceptual relations between these two concepts are correct. I also agree with her central normative claim that we are often justified in believing on authority, and are sometimes rationally required to do so. Indeed, I have defended similar conceptual and normative claims in my Ph.D. dissertation (Keren 2006) and in subsequent writings (Keren 2007; forthcoming) . Nonetheless, I think that in arguing for these claims, Zagzebski has ignored important differences between practical authority and authority in the domain of belief, and that as a result her attempt to explain why it is rational to believe on authority is lacking. Because I think that these differences are of much epistemological significance, my discussion here will focus on Zagzebski's attempt to show that Raz's account of political authority, when properly interpreted, is applicable to the domain of beliefs (Zagzebski 2012, ch. 5) , and will try to show where her application of the Razian account goes wrong. Obviously, this will leave untouched much of what Zagzebski does in this rich and important book.
Raz's develops his account of authority by claiming that a number of thesescontent independence, the preemption-, dependence-, and normal justification theses-are true of political authorities, and that some-e.g., the no-difference thesis-are not. Zagzebski attempts to show that analogues of the theses that are satisfied by political authorities are also satisfied by epistemic authorities; and that the no-difference thesis, which is not true of political authorities, is also not true of epistemic authorities. Thus, the basic contours of epistemic authority match the contours that Raz ascribes to political authority. This, I argue, is only partly true. Starting with the conceptual claim about what epistemic authority and believing on authority consist in, I argue ( §1) that Zagzebski is correct in identifying the preemptive nature of reasons provided by an authority as central to our understanding of epistemic authority. Thus Zagzebski is correct that Raz's preemption thesis is satisfied by epistemic authority. However, while this central feature is shared by epistemic and political authorities, other significant features are not. Thus, I argue ( §2) that the no-difference thesis, when interpreted in the way intended by Raz, is true of epistemic authorities, despite being false of political authorities, and that Zagzebski's characterization of the distinguishing feature of authority can therefore be misleading. Finally, I turn to the rationality of believing on authority ( §3): I argue that Zagzebski's attempt to show that an analogue of the normal justification thesis applies to the domain of belief again ignores key differences between belief and action, and that her explanation of the rationality of believing on authority therefore fails. A successful explanation of this will need to be more attuned to the differences between political and epistemic authorities.
Authority, Trust and Preemption
Zagzebski opens her book by noting that authority in the domain of belief, unlike practical authority, receives little attention in contemporary philosophy. Her aim is to change this, and to convince us of the rationality of believing on authority.
Focusing mainly on the point of view of the subject, of a subject asking herself "how she should get beliefs she accepts upon reflection," she claims that "we are all committed to accepting epistemic authority." (2012, (2) (3) . Her argument for this claim is built of two main stages. In the first, she argues that epistemic-trust in others is not rationally escapable. By virtue of our rational, inescapable trust in ourselves, and by virtue of the similarity between ourselves and others, we are committed to placing epistemic-trust in others.
2 At the second stage she attempts to establish that "among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities" (3). treat another as an epistemic authority: her refusal to let the authority's belief replace her own consideration of the evidence will then count as grounds for criticizing her.
Indeed, this is a form of criticism we are apt to make when we think that a subject should believe upon others' authority, e.g., when we think that laypersons should 2 A second feature of self trust that commits us to epistemically trusting others is our rational trust in our emotions, and in particular, in our epistemic admiration of others (Zagzebski 2012, 93) defer to the authority of scientists but they refuse to do so, 3 This might require introducing a minor revision in Zagzebski's account of the distinguishing features of epistemic authority. For we might want to distinguish, as
Zagzebski does, between being epistemically trustworthy and having epistemic authority, and between believing on trust, and believing on authority. 5 Even if our notion of trust essentially involves the idea of preemption, there is a distinction to be made between the kind of preemptive reasons for belief provided by the report of an authoritative expert, and the preemptive reasons for belief typically provided to the expert by a trustworthy layperson's report. Even if the expert trusts the layperson, she may not treat her as an authority. But then it is not the ability to generate preemptive reasons for belief that distinguishes having epistemic authority from being epistemically trustworthy. What distinguishes between the two is the force of the preemptive reasons that one has the power to generate. The belief of epistemic authorities provides me with preemptive reasons for belief that make it epistemically irresponsible for me to form the relevant belief on my own weighing of the evidence.
In contrast, the beliefs of trustworthy thinkers give me reasons that need not render it epistemically irresponsible for me to form the belief on my own weighing of the evidence, even if they also make it responsible for me to allow the expert's belief to preempt my own. In this sense, what is distinctive of epistemic authority is that it is the normative power not just to provide others with reasons to believe something preemptively, but that it is the power to generate to others an epistemic duty to believe something preemptively. 
Generating Preemptive Reasons for Belief
Believing on authority thus involves seeing ourselves as having a preemptive reason for belief. There is thus a sense, in which Zagzebski is correct that one has 5 Zagzebski assumes that we can believe upon trust, without believing on authority because she employs a notion of epistemic trust weaker than the one singled-out here, and which entails seeing a trusted thinker's belief that p as providing us with a prima-facie reason for believing p, but not with a preemptive reason for believing p. 6 In this sense, the kind of normative power distinctive of epistemic authorities is more similar to the normative power of practical and political authorities than Zagzebski's formulation suggests. To say that I have (practical) authority over my son is to say not only that I can generate reasons for him to do things preemptively, but that I can generate duties for my son (Enoch forthcoming).
epistemic authority only if one has the normative power to generate such reasons.
However, there is an important sense of "generating reasons" in which this false: a sense in which practical authorities indeed have the normative power to generate reasons to do things preemptively, but in which epistemic authorities do not have the normative power to generate preemptive reasons for belief. This is arguably an important aspect of a proper understanding of the working of preemptive reasons for belief and of the very concept of epistemic authority.
In presenting his account of practical authority, Raz discusses, and rejects, what he calls the no-difference thesis, according to which, "the exercise of authority should make no difference to what its subject ought to do for it ought to direct them to do what they ought to do in any event" (Raz 1986, 48 understand why it is right to dismiss these counterexamples, as cases where knowledge is based on testimony, but not in the normal way (Williamson 2000, 257) .
To trust a speaker, we have noted, is to see her testimony as providing us with preemptive reasons to believe what she says; but epistemic authorities, and epistemically trustworthy speakers more generally, can generate preemptive reasons for belief only in the weak sense. Thus the reason made available to audiences by the speaker's testimony, in as much as it is made available to them through the distinctive normative structure associated with trust, cannot be stronger than the reason available to the speaker herself. In as much as a belief owes its epistemic status to trust, its epistemic status cannot be better than the epistemic status of the belief of the trusted person. If a hearer comes to know by believing an unknowing speaker's testimony, this can only be because her testimonially-based belief is supported by other reasons beyond the reasons for belief provided by the testimony itself, reasons which were not preempted by the speaker's testimony. Therefore, the justification for the hearer's belief is not a product of the distinctive normative structure associated with epistemic trust and authority, and her way of gaining knowledge is not the normal way of obtaining knowledge through testimony (Keren 2007 ).
Justified belief on authority
The characterization of the distinguishing features of epistemic authority leaves open the question whether we should ever form a belief on a person's authority:
Should we ever treat the fact that a putative authority believes that p not just as a reason for believing p, but as one that has preemptive force? Zagzebski defends a positive answer to the question, and does so by applying to the domain of belief another Razian theses-the normal justification thesis (NJT).
According to NJT, the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly. (Raz 1986, 53) Zagzebski adopts an analogous thesis about the justification of epistemic authority: She then employs a Razian argument-the financial shares argument (Raz 1986, 67-69) -to show that the conditions set by JAB1 are indeed satisfied by preemptively believing on authority.
There are thus two questions to ask about Zagzebski's NJT-based argument for the justification of believing on authority: (1) does JAB1 indeed set a correct standard for the justification of belief on authority? (2) Does Raz's financial shares argument, when applied to the case of belief, indeed show that believing on authority satisfies the conditions set by JAB1? It seems to me that Zagzebski's positive answer to both questions is mistaken. Zagzebski seems to ignore important differences between the practical and the epistemic domain, which undermine her application of the Razian justification of acting on authority to the justification of believing on authority.
Consider first the standard of justification set by JAB1. Both NJT and JAB1 assume a strong connection between doing the best one can, and being justified. NJT assumes that acting on authority is justified if and because doing so is the best way one has of complying with reasons that apply independently. Similarly, JAB1
assumes that believing on authority is justified if and because doing so is the best way one has of achieving the epistemic goals of believing truth and avoiding error. the best action that she has available (while disagreeing on what makes an action "best"). 7 See, e.g., Zimmerman (1996) . Some views about supererogation might attempt to loosen this strong connection between "ought" and "good", to allow for the possibility of actions that are beyond the call of duty: thus they would allow that action A may be better than B, but that we have no duty to perform A and may permissibly perform B. Even if the kind of normative evaluation we are interested in involves a weak notion of epistemic entitlement, one that does not suffice to render true belief knowledge, it is doubtful whether JAB1 provides us with an adequate account. JAB1
"best" and "ought". Even if one may perform an action which is not best, in the relevant sense of "best" picked by the moral theory, it is always the case that one may also perform whatever action is best. No moral theory would suggest that an action which is best cannot justifiably be performed.
appears inadequate even if we take it as an account of reasonable belief, or if we focus only on the reflective thinker's own perspective. Thus, it is unclear whether a subject can hold a belief, knowing that he only holds it because this is what an unreliable thinker believes, and because other available ways of deciding on what to believe are even less reliable. Again, this does not seem to be the right kind of reason when it comes to belief. Moreover, even if he could somehow sustain his belief while knowing that it is not supported by the right kind of reason, because he can know this, his belief will arguably not be a reasonable one, at least not in an epistemic sense.
To some extent, Zagzebski seems to be aware of this problem with JAB1.
Thus she notes that JAB1 is "not sufficient to justify taking a belief on epistemic authority without qualifications…[for] I might judge that even though the putative authority is more likely to get the truth whether p than I, the authority is not very likely to get the truth either." (Zagzebski 2012, 111) However, she does not explain what other conditions must be met for a belief on authority to be justified or reasonable. But our discussion of what epistemic authority consists in may suggest what element, missing from JAB1, must be part of any plausible justification of belief on authority: If to have authority is to have the power to provide others with preemptive reasons for belief that allow one's good reasons for believing something to support others' belief in the same thing, then to be justified in believing on authority, one must be justified in believing that the putative authority has good reasons for believing as she does. This is what Al is not justified in believing about Sue.
Zagzebski also fails to provide a good explanation of why the conditions specified by JAB1 are likely to be fulfilled by believing on authority: Why are we more likely to form a true belief and avoid a false belief if we treat a putative authority's belief as giving us a reason that preempts other evidence, rather than by Zagzebski (2012, 114) responds to this challenge by drawing on Raz's financial shares argument. Consider a case where I am faced with a practical decision-"whether or not to sell certain shares" (Raz 1986, 67) , and suppose that I am given advice by a financial expert, such that all that I know about her is that she is more likely to make the right decision than I am when I form an independent judgment. Raz argues that in such a case I can do no better than by allowing the expert's judgment to preempt my judgment altogether. If instead I treat it as providing me with an additional prima facie reason, I will not do as good. For "only by allowing the authority's judgment to pre-empt mine altogether will I succeed in improving my performance and bringing it to the level of the authority" (1986, 68) : Only in this way can I lower my rate of mistake so that it matches that of the expert. If instead I assign some weight to my own independent judgment and some (greater) weight to hers, in a way that will allow her judgment to reverse my own in a certain proportion of the cases, then my rate of mistake would still be higher than the expert's, even if it would be lower than the rate of mistake of my independent judgment: My rate of mistake will likely match the authority's low rate of mistake in that proportion of the cases where my judgment conforms to hers, but will match the higher rate of mistake of my independent judgment in those cases where my judgment differs from hers. In the kind of practical case described by Raz, there are only two qualitatively different options-"Sell" and "Don't Sell"-and two possible states of the world: one in which "Sell" is best, another in which "Don't Sell" is best. Given appropriate assumptions, which are arguably satisfied in the case described by Raz, 8 always following the expert's judgment makes it most likely that you will choose the best option (and most likely that you will avoid the worst), and is therefore the best possible strategy. However, in cases where the question is what to believe, even if there are also just two relevant states of the world-p and not-p, there are always (at least) three qualitatively different options: "believe p", "believe not-p", and "suspend judgment". In the practical case described by Raz, there is no third option, in the sense that the possible payoffs of not-deciding are identical to that of deciding not to sell. In contrast, in the case of belief the possible epistemic payoffs of withholding judgment are different both from those of "believing p" and of "believing not-p." Even if the expert's rate of mistake is lower than my own independent rate of mistake, so that always following the expert's judgment makes it most likely that I will choose the best option (believing truth), it does not follow that this is the best possible strategy. For I can significantly improve my chances of avoiding the worst option-falsely believing-if I do not allow the expert's judgment to preempt my own. By suspending judgment in at least some proportion of the cases in which she believes p and I independently believe not-p (or vice versa)-cases in which she is much more likely to be mistaken compared to cases on which we agree-I can lower the probability of error not only below that of my own independent judgment, but also below that of the expert. Accordingly, even if all I know is that she is more likely to form the correct judgment than I independently am, when the issue is what to believe, it is simply not the case that I will be more likely to form a true belief and avoid a false belief if I allow the expert's judgment to preempt mine. 9 option), so that we do not care more about making one type of mistake rather than the other. But this condition is often satisfied, and is arguably often satisfied in the kind of case discussed by Raz. 9 Note that this objection to the applicability of Raz's financial-shares argument to the case of belief depends on Zagzebski's specification of our epistemic goals in terms of believing truth and avoiding error. If these are our epistemic goals then we have an option-that of withholding judgment-that, while not best, allows us to guarantee an epistemic payoff which is second-best. It is because of the I conclude therefore that Zagzebski's attempt to justify our believing on authority, by applying the Razian framework to the domain of belief, is inadequate. It fails to set an adequate standard for the justification of belief on authority; and it fails to show that believing on authority ever satisfies those standards that it does set. This does not mean that Zagzebski is mistaken in her important claim, that we are often justified in treating a thinker's belief as a reason that has preemptive force and that we are sometimes rationally required to do so. On the contrary, this important claim seems to me to be quite true (Keren 2006, forthcoming) . However, what our discussion suggests is that in order to show that it is true we must be more attuned to the differences between the way authority functions in the practical and epistemic domains.
Our discussion suggests, that both an adequate account of what epistemic authority consists in, and an adequate explanation of why believing on authority can be justified, must appeal to the good reasons for the (same) belief that the authoritative thinker has. In accounting for what epistemic authority consists in, we ought not to say that it consists in the ability to generate reasons to believe something preemptively in the strong sense; instead, it consists in the power to provide others with preemptive reasons for belief that allow their beliefs to be supported by the authority's good reasons for belief. And in presenting an account of the justification of our believing on authority, we will have to appeal to these good reasons, and to the support they can provide to our belief: first, in specifying what conditions must be availability of this option that we should not always adopt the expert's judgment, even if doing so is most likely to result in the optimal payoff. If, however, our epistemic goal is different from that specified by Zagzebski, then it might be possible to apply Raz's financial-shares argument to the case of belief without succumbing to the objection, if this alternative conception does not allow us to guarantee an epistemic payoff which is second-best. This may suggest, in line with other objections to Zagzebski's account made here, that a successful justification of believing on authority would most likely appeal to the epistemic goal of holding doxastic attitudes that fit the evidence. Zagzebski comes close at one point to proposing that believing on authority should be justified in terms of such an evidential goal, but rejects this, claiming that believing on the evidence is neither our ultimate epistemic goal, nor our most important one (2012, 110) . met for our belief on authority to be justified; and second, in explaining how, by allowing the authority's judgment to preempt our own, these conditions can be met. In this, the justification of believing on authority will differ not only in details, but in structure, from the justification of acting on authority. In explaining our justification for doing Φ on an authoritative command, we need not appeal to reasons for Φ'ing existing independently of the command. After all, it is the command itself that can generate these reasons. In contrast, in explaining our justification for believing p on an authoritative testimony, we must appeal to reasons for p which the authority has independently of her telling us that p, and to our reasons for believing that such reasons might support our own belief if we believe on authority.
